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This paper sets out to explore the relation between social argumentation and inner 
debate by taking into account suggestions from argumentation studies and from social 
and discursive psychology. It develops Dascal’s (2005) claim that there are 
metonymical and structural relations between the two realms of debate by 
substantiating it with data taken from international migrants’ inner debates at 
moments of difficult decisions. The data are drawn from the experience of migrating 
mothers who have to decide whether to go back or to remain in their host country (the 
UK). I show that others are present in migrants’ multivoiced decisions in two 
important senses: first, inner debates can be reconstructed as critical discussions (van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984). Second, the locus from analogy has the special 
function of allowing the comparison between the migrant’s experience and someone 
else’s experience. 
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In every voice he could hear two contending voices 




Different streams in psycho-social research have pinpointed the profound unity existing 
between dialogue with others and dialogue with oneself. Thinking is a social activity per se, 
imbibed with the presence of others (Marková 2006, Perret-Clermont 2000, Billig 1996). 
Dialogue with oneself and dialogue with others seem therefore not to be two idiosyncratic 
phenomena, despite the attention of argumentation and debate studies being primarily 
focused on social activities (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 55). Their obvious 
differences notwithstanding, there are similarities and commonalities between external 
dialogue, involving different individuals, and internal debate and reasoning (Dascal 2005). 
Billig (1996: 57) even argues that “psychologists have overlooked the extent to which our 
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inner deliberations are silent arguments conducted within a single self. If deliberation is a 
form of argument, then our thought processes, far from being inherently mysterious events, 
are modelled upon public debate” (my emphasis). 
In this paper, I choose to follow the path traced by Billig (1996) and Dascal (2005); 
more in particular, I embrace Dascal’s hypothesis that inner debate and public argumentation 
are contiguous and structurally similar forms of communication; and I set out to prove this 
empirically. I claim that a clue that hints to such continuity and structural similarity is the 
presence of others in an individual’s inner debate. Therefore, I investigate how others are 
present in inner debate. This paper will show that, when individuals reflect with themselves, 
not necessarily they are alone. They know what others have told them. They keep something 
for them of others’ claims and argumentations and feel the need to respond. They want to 
justify their decisions publicly, when they feel they are going towards what is believed to be 
common sense. Even when facing very personal decisions, they do not want to evade the 
others’ acknowledgement of the reasonableness of their decisions. I will elaborate on this 
perspective by providing some evidence of how others are present in inner dialogue. Such 
evidence is drawn from a corpus of data concerning international migrants faced with crucial 
decisions such as whether to permanently return to their home country or to stay over in the 
host country (section 3). 
I will proceed as follows. In section 2, I will discuss the state of the art of works 
concerning self-debate and social debate or, more generally, language and thought. I will do 
so by considering, on the one hand, the important contributions by Vygotsky and Bakthin 
(2.1); on the other hand, I will concentrate more specifically on the debate on the boundary 
and relations between argumentation and inner debate (2.2.). In section 2.2, I will equally 
present Dascal’s hypothesis, which I am largely relying on in this paper, even though keeping 
in mind the important clues emerging from other theoretical contributions. After having 
introduced the data which I am going to analyse (section 3), I will discuss them. Two aspects 
emerge in relation to the presence of others in inner dialogue: the emergence of inner 
argumentative discussions (section 4.1) and the comparisons via locus from analogy (4.2). I 
will then briefly conclude in section 5. 
2 Inner debate and argumentation: state of the debate 
 
2.1 Vygotsky and Bakhtin 
When approaching the study of inner dialogue, we stand on the shoulders of two giants of the 
past century: Lev Vygotsky and Mikhail Bakhtin, to whom many disciplinary traditions owe 
a lot for different reasons. Their interests and approaches converge on the study of the 
internal processes connected to inner dialogue. As Wertsch (1991: 13) puts it, both scholars 
share the assumption that certain aspects of human mental functioning, including 
psychological processes carried out by an individual in isolation, are fundamentally tied to 
communicative processes and encompass communication. 
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Vygotsky (1896-1934) is interested in an ontogenetic approach to inner speech; in 
other words, he investigates how inner speech and thought are developed in the child. We 
owe to this author the hypothesis that inner speech be a form of internalized dialogue, learnt 
by the child after he masters communicative speech (Vygotsky 1962: 19). Moving from some 
of Piaget’s earlier works on preschool children, Vygotsky hypothesizes that “egocentric 
speech”, namely loud speech addressed to the child himself, is a temporary form of loud 
inner speech. In schoolchildren, egocentric speech is not present, having evolved into inner 
speech already. In other words, schoolchildren and adults do not stop to speak to themselves; 
they simply do it internally, in such a way that we do not have any loud sign of inner speech 
left. According to Vygotsky, in fact, adults’ inner speech coincides with their “thinking for 
themselves” (ibid., p. 18). Thus, for this author, it is thought that follows language and not the 
opposite. Vygotsky claims that “the speech structures mastered by the child become the basic 
structures of his thinking” (ibid., p. 51). I will come back to this point when approaching the 
theory of argument schemes in section 4.2. It is important to remind that Vygotsky’s view has 
originated a prolific stream of studies in social and developmental psychology; it had more or 
less direct influence on a number of authors (see Wertsch 1985, 1999; Zittoun 2006). 
Vygotsky’s perspective is focused on inter- and intra-psychological processes and their 
relation, approaching inner dialogue from the point of view of developmental psychology. A 
semioticiani and a literary critic, Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975) approaches inner dialogue 
from the point of view of communication. We owe to him the concept of a profound 
dialogicality and multivoicedness of all inner processes of thinking and decision-making (cf. 
in particular Bakhtin 1984). 
Bakhtin develops his theory by studying the structure of the novel and, in particular, 
the works by Fyodor Dostoevsky, whom he considers the initiator of the dialogic novel 
(1984). In Bakhtin’s view, Dostoevsky’s novels are characterized by “a plurality of 
independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses” (1984: 6), the characters being “free 
people capable of standing alongside their creator, capable of not agreeing with him” (ibid.). 
Bakhtin often makes use of a metaphor drawn from the musical domain to describe this type 
of novel: he speaks of polyphony, thus comparing dialogic novels and contrapuntal harmony. 
In Chapter 2 of his “Problems of Dostoevsky’s poetics”, he gives the example of 
Raskolnikov’s inner dialogue at the very beginning of Crime and Punishment. This example 
is particularly relevant to our investigation because Bakhtin manages to show how others 
may be present in the inner dialogue of a person who faces a difficult decision. In this 
dialogical monologue, Bakhtin observes, all future major characters of the novel are present; 
and “Raskolnikov has entered into a fundamental and intense interior dialogue with them, a 
dialogue of ultimate questions and ultimate life decisions”. It is worth quoting some brief 
excerpts from Raskolnikov’s inner dialogue, whose topic is Dunechka’s decision to marry 
Luzhin: 
It’s clear that Rodion Romanovich Raskolnikov is the central figure in the business, 
and no one else. Oh yes, she can ensure his happiness, keep him in the university, 
make his whole future secure; perhaps he may even be a rich man later on, 
prosperous, respected, and may even end his life a famous man! But my mother? It’s 
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all Rodya, precious Rodya, her firstborn! For such a son who would not sacrifice such 
a daughter! […] Sonya, Sonya Marmeladova, the eternal victim so long as the world 
lasts. Have you taken the measure of your sacrifice, both of you? Is it right? Can you 
bear it? Is it any use? Is there sense in it? And let me tell you, Dounia, Sonya’s life is 
no wors than life with Mr. Luzhin. ‘There can be no question of love’, mother writes. 
And what if there can be no respect either, if on the contrary there is aversion, 
contempt, repulsion, what then? […](Dostoevsky 1910, q.td in Bakthin 1984[1929]: 
74).  
As we can see, Raskolnikov reports words uttered or written by other characters; he engages 
in a fierce dialogue with them, answering to their words and challenging them. Bakhtin 
characterizes this dialogue as featuring a conflict of voices, in which we hear the main 
character’s bitter irony, for example, as stratified over the intonation of the other characters’ 
words. The other characters are virtually present in the here-and-now of Raskolnikov’s 
decision. It is important to spend a few words to give a fuller account of Bakhtin’s approach, 
as dialogism is not limited to the world of artistic prose or to inner dialogue. As Bakhtin puts 
it, the dialogic orientation is a natural property of any living discourse in everyday life, inside 
and outside institutional settings: 
But as we have already said, every extra-artistic prose discourse – in any of its forms, 
quotidian, rhetorical, scholarly – cannot fail to be oriented toward the “already 
uttered”, the “already known”, the “common opinion” and so forth. The dialogic 
orientation of discourse is a phenomenon that is, of course, a property of any 
discourse. It is the natural orientation of any living discourse. On all its various routes 
toward the object, in all its directions, the word encounters an alien word and cannot 
help encountering it in a living, tension-filled interaction (Bakthin 1981: 279). 
Dialogism is thus an immanent propriety of any uttered world, insofar as it refers to other 
discourses. Therefore, Bakhtin (1981, 1986) speaks of addressivity of all discourses, because 
“every word is directed toward an answer and cannot escape the profound influence of the 
answering word that it anticipates”. (1981: 279, emphasis in the original). It is true that 
Bakhtin suggested that words reflect the multiple voices of “a given culture, people and 
epoch”. In this relation, Wertsch (1991: 53) remarks that Bakhtin did not limit the notion of 
addressee to the immediate speech situation. Instead, he considered that “the voice or voices 
to which an utterance is addressed maybe temporally, spatially and socially distant” (ibid.). 
Dialogism, however, is present as well in the relation between the speaker and people who 
have talked to him/her recently and who are still present in the speaker’s inner discourse: 
This addressee can be an immediate participant-interlocutor in an everyday dialogue, 
a differentiated collective of specialists in some particular area of cultural 
communication, a more or less differentiated public, ethnic group, contemporaries, 
like-minded people, opponents and enemies, a subordinate, a superior, someone who 
is lower, higher, familiar, foreign, and so forth. And it can also be an indefinite, 
unconcretized other (Bakhtin 1986: 95 q.td in Wertsch 1991: 53). 
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Arguably, by this saying Bakhtin is emphasizing the continuity of interpersonal dialogue and 
inner dialogue by showing, via the notion of addressivity, that others are present in inner 
dialogue. 
Bakthin’s notion of a dialogical orientation of discourse has had a profound influence 
on fields so various as to comprise psychology, linguistics and discourse studies, originating 
a series of “dialogical approaches to language and cognition” (Grossen and Salazar Orvig 
2011: 492; cf. Grossen 2010 as well). A leading figure who is bringing Bakthin’s intuitions 
forward is certainly Ivana Marková. Concerning inner discourse, this author employs the 
phrase Inner Alter to identify “the symbolically and socially represented kinds of the Alter 
that are in an internal dialogue with the Ego” (Marková 2006: 135), thus highlighting the 
possibility for others to be present in a subject’s inner dialogue. The Inner Alter may take 
different forms: reference groups, conscience, individual and collective memories, 
commitments and loyalties, and so on (ibid., p. 136; see also Marková et al. 2007). 
 
2.2 The blurred boundaries of argumentation as a social activity 
There certainly is a conflict of opinion, or difference of opinion, at the heart of Raskolnikov’s 
inner dialogue partially reported in the preceding section. It is clear that he is opposing other 
characters’ standpoints, challenging them with questions which express doubts. In facing a 
difficult decision, Raskolnikov lives an argumentative discussion within his mind, which 
Dostoevsky discloses to his readers. One would imagine that the striking connection of this 
kind of inner dialogue to social argumentative discussions has been already thoroughly 
examined. Yet when it comes to argumentation studies, regrettably few authors approach the 
topic of inner dialogue. Such gap is even more problematic if we consider that it might lead 
to a paradox. If inner dialogue is not a form of argumentation, what is it then? Should we 
think of two completely idiosyncratic phenomena, we would paradoxically maintain that, in a 
public argumentative discussion, standpoints are defended reasonably; yet that they originate 
uncritically in the black box of the arguers’ minds. So one would be bound to publicly defend 
in a reasonable fashion what he has unreasonably decided in his silent thoughts. 
Even intuitively, this is not the right interpretation.  I will therefore take another path. 
In this section, I will take into account three authors who did indeed start the endeavour of 
considering the connection between public debate and inner argumentation. Two of them – 
M. Dascal and A. Rocci – are more typical argumentation scholars, while a third one – M. 
Billig – is one of the most prominent scholars working within discursive psychology. 
It is commonly held that argumentation is a social activity (see for example the 
pragma-dialectical approach proposed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 2004). This 
view imposes a limitation to the study of properly said argumentative phenomena. In my 
opinion, this limitation is correct in theory; but it has been interpreted in such a way as to 
narrow the focus of the study of debate; and it is often unduly interpreted as if suggesting an 
opposition between argumentation studies and social psychology. In argumentation, two or 
more disputants have some form of disagreement which is called a difference of opinion (van 
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Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). Rather than resorting to violence or other forms of non-
communicative ways out of a difference of opinion, the two disputants try and engage in a 
form of dialogue characterized by the pursuit of reasonableness; in other words, they are 
committed to critically test their respective standpoints and arguments in search for a valid 
resolution of their disagreement. This characterizes the form of debate that is called critical 
discussion in the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation (ibid.); other authors prefer 
the term controversy to describe a similar phenomenon (see Dascal 1998). In the integrated 
pragma-dialectical approach to social argumentation, the arguers’ dialectical aim to solve 
their difference of opinion on the merits by means of a critical discussion is always paired 
with a rhetorical goal. Each arguer wants to win his cause; at the same time, he is committed 
to do it reasonably. Maintaining the balance between the commitment to reasonableness and 
the attempt at being effective means that the arguers have to manoeuver strategically in all 
moves that are carried out in an argumentative discussion (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 
2002). In particular, strategic manoeuvring manifests itself in the discourse through three 
aspects: “A particular choice made from the available topical potential, a particular way in 
which the opportunities for framing the addressee’s perspective are used [audience demand], 
and a particular way in which presentational possibilities are exploited [presentational 
devices]” (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2009: 6). 
Social argumentation certainly has peculiar characteristics which are not present in 
inner debate. For one, as Dascal (2005: 48) puts it, external debates take place “between 
clearly demarcated and ontologically independent entities”, namely human beings. The 
communicative and non-communicative behaviour of another human being, the so-called 
antagonist, in the here-and-now of social debate, is always to some extent unpredictable and, 
thus, potentially surprising. The real other – differently from Marková’s Inner Alter – cannot 
ultimately be reduced to our anticipations, because he or she is always free to modify his or 
her standpoint, to accept ours, to leave the discussion, to bring forward an argument we didn’t 
initially think of, etc. 
In this sense, social argumentation and inner argumentation are certainly distinct 
phenomena. Nevertheless, a pioneer in this pursuit, Dascal, suggests considering external 
debate as a counterpart to self-debate (ibid., p. 34). More precisely, his proposal is twofold. 
On the one hand, he hypothesizes that there is a metonymical relation (what I will call 
contiguity) between these two types of debate: “Criticism by others may engender, along with 
a public polemical exchange, an inner process of self-criticism or at least of self-
examination” (ibid., p. 45). There is, thus, temporal, psychological and communicative 
continuity between social argumentation and inner dialogue. For example, one may make up 
her mind about a certain course of action and, then, try and persuade her husband about it; 
then she may accept some of the husband’s criticisms and go back to a process of self-debate, 
concerning the validity of her decision (see also Mercier and Sperber 2011: 66). This is line 
with the results of social psychology showing that individuals who make a decision are not in 
a social void; they connect to their community before, during and after their reasoning 
process, in order to make sense of the situation and elaborate a judgment (Perret-Clermont 
and Zittoun 2002: 3). 
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On the other hand, Dascal highlights that there are structural analogies between self-
debate and public debate. He argues that the metaphor “argument is a war” applies to both 
realms of debate: in both we would have positions, targets, contenders… Then, different 
candidates fill up these “slots” of the general structure of “argumentation as war” in debating 
with self and debating with others. For example, while the contenders may be two human 
beings in external debate, they may be “different faculties of the mind” in self-debate (ibid., 
p. 49). In order to single out the analogies between self-debate and social argumentation, 
Dascal moves from Aristotle’s suggestion to apply one and the same term, namely 
deliberation, to both inner and social debate (ibid., p. 53). This suggestion may be reasoned 
out from the accounts of deliberation in the Nicomachean Ethics and in Rhetoric respectively. 
In both cases, as Dascal shows, deliberation has the following characteristics, which I 
synthetically regroup as follows: 
• Orientation to the choice of a future course of action 
• Pursuit of rational persuasion (of oneself or others) 
• What is probable (rather than what is necessary) is the object of deliberative activities. 
Elaborating on and departing from this “Aristotelian clue”, as he calls it, Dascal suggests a 
parallel between Aristotle’s deliberation and self-controversy, namely inner argumentative 
discussion oriented towards a model of reasonable resolution of disagreement. Yet he also 
accounts for a further two types of self-debate. The former, which he calls self-discussion, is 
characterized by mathematical rationality; the arguers’ personal and emotional side has no 
room in it. The latter, called self-debate, includes pre-decision and post-decision forms of 
self-deception and, as we might put it, auto-manipulation. These two types depart from the 
ideal model of an argumentative discussion; thus, in this paper, we will restrict our interest to 
self-controversy. Dascal, however, has the merit to show that the phenomenon of 
manipulation and the so-called derailments of the arguers’ strategic manoeuvring, to put it in 
pragma-dialectical terms, may occur in self-debate as well. This is, after all, a further analogy 
of self-debate and public-debate. 
Coming back to the structural analogies between self-debate and public debate, there 
is one more theoretical suggestion which expands on Dascal’s account. Rocci (2005) suggests 
that inner argumentative dialogue (in his terms: soliloquy) could be considered as analogous 
to a reflexive predicate of the type “she washed herself”. The reflexive verb indicates two 
logically distinct entities which are however covered by the same person (she/herself), albeit 
taken in different aspects: who is washing is the entire individual, a rational human being 
capable of action; while who is being washed is just her body. Analogously, in fact, in 
soliloquy the overarching argumentative function foresees two logically distinct roles – 
speaker and hearer, protagonist and antagonist, arguer and audience – which however are in 
practice covered by one and the same human being. This human being is considered in 
different aspects; Rocci (2005:101) cites a dictum attributed to Pierce, who is said to have 
claimed that all thinking is dialogical and that “yourself of one instant appeals to your deeper 
self for his assent” (see Schlesinger, Keren-Portnoy, and Parush 2002, q.td in Rocci, ibid). 
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A scholar who approaches argumentation from the background of rhetorical 
psychology, Michael Billig, draws very similar conclusions to Dascal’s. He argues that, if 
witcraft (Lat. inventio) is a basic form of thought, “then we can expect private thinking to be 
modelled upon public argument” (Billig 1996: 141; Billig et al. 1988: 17). In his view, we 
assume both the role of proposer (protagonist) and critic (antagonist), thus arranging our 
inner debate. When debating internally, “the individual decision-maker must oscillate 
between the different arguments and has the responsibility for inventing both pro and con 
reasonings” (ibid., p. 144). When facing an important decision, such as whether to get 
married, it is not sufficient that individuals “echo the reasons for one action”; they must 
“conduct some sort of internal debate” in order to deliberate properly (Billig et al. 1988: 17). 
Collecting some evidence from William James’ research on inner controversies on religion 
lived by believers and disbelievers (James 1902), Billig argues that some of the most 
dramatic argumentative confrontations occur internally (ibid). The religious domain may 
certainly become a highly dramatic arena of personal deliberation processes; Billig (1996: 
143) views this as a case of decision-making, namely when “then individual is involved in a 
protracted and agonizing dilemma about which course of action should be taken”. Similarly, 
Dascal (2005) suggests that inner debate often arises when individuals are confronted with 
difficult decisions, which imply complex decision-making or deliberation procedures. I will 
take care of these suggestions and proceed, in this paper, focusing on inner debates 
characterized by pragmatic reasoning. 
The theoretical accounts of inner debate stemming from argumentation and rhetoric, 
as well as those stemming from a Vygotskyan perspective, look promising.  Unfortunately, 
however, they have been applied to scarce, if any, real data. With the present contribution, I 
set out to substantiate this approach by providing empirical details on how this particular 
form of reflexive debate occurs. In the next section, I will describe the type of data which will 
constitute a basis for my paper. 
3 The data 
 
The data I will be considering have been collected in the framework of the project “Migrants 
in transition: an argumentative perspective”, funded by the Swiss National Science 
Foundation (PBTIP1-133595, 2010-2012). Twenty-nine migrating mothers of different ethnic 
and linguistic backgrounds (aged 25 to 50) have been interviewed about their experience of 
international migration. These migration experiences had a common end point: at the time of 
the study, the interviewees had all been living in the greater London area for a period of one 
to twenty-two yearsii. The interviews lasted from 32 to 90 minutes (average: 60.89 recorded 
min, mode: 60 min); they were all recorded and transcribed according to the standards of 
conversation analysis adapted to the needs of an argumentative analysis (for a discussion on 
this aspect, see Greco Morasso 2011). 
The project intended to focus on the migrants’ inner dialogue; in particular, I assumed 
from socio-cultural psychology the focus on how they coped with the rupture of leaving their 
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country and moving abroad and the following processes of transition, including adaptation to 
a new life, sense-making and learning (Zittoun 2006). International migration has been 
proven a significant rupture in the individuals’ life (Kadianaki 2010; Hale and De Abreu 
2010); therefore it is a promising domain to study inner dialogue in decision-making 
processes. In this case, the rupture of international migration is combined with the experience 
of motherhood (Greco Morasso 2012). Depending on different circumstances, these two 
spheres of experience may support each other, the one providing a sense of continuity to the 
other (as suggested by Zittoun and Grossen, forthcoming); or they might be perceived as two 
synchronous ruptures which to some extent magnify each other’s dilemmas (cf. Tummala-
Narra 2004, Sigad and Eisikovits 2009). Mothers tend to feel worries and expectations about 
themselves and their children, having to deal with specific issues such as childcare, schooling 
and health in the new country. Moreover, they are at the heart of the family communication 
network often including grandparents in the sending country and other relatives; therefore, 
they are likely to closely participate in the decision-making process at crucial times, such as, 
for example, when they must decide whether to return to their home country. 
From the methodological point of view, the study of migrants’ processes of transition is 
supported, in general, by in-depth reconstructive interviews. Via this method, individuals 
reconstruct how they lived a moment of rupture and the following transition a posteriori 
(Zittoun 2009: 415ff). Considering the data emerged from this type of interviews from a 
discourse analytical perspective and, in particular, from the vantage point of debate and 
argumentation, permits to analyse the individuals’ decision-making processes, including 
internal differences of opinion and their resolution. In my case, all the interviewees judged 
their experience of migration as satisfying or even rewarding. Nevertheless, they all testified 
to a difficult process of decision-making, concerning in particular the turning points 
constituted by the decision to migrate and the decision (not) to return respectively. Generally 
speaking, these are crucial times in a migrant’s experience (cf. Finch et al. 2009). In relation 
to the decision-making processes, the selection of migrating mothers is further motivated by 
the increasing awareness that migrants’ decisions are often taken on a family basis rather than 
on an individual basis. Such awareness is emerging in the new economics theories of labour 
migration as well as in the study of migrants’ social networks (see Castles and Miller 2009: 
24-25 and 28ff respectively; see also Van Hear 2010: 35). Because migrating mothers often 
bridge and mediate between two generations, studying their decision processes allows having 
a multi-layered section of a family decision. 
Some remarks are necessary about the type of data rendered by in-depth interviews in 
relation to interest in inner dialogue. The data I am relying on constitute the migrants’ self-
reflection on their experience as it is externalized to an observer (the interviewer). The 
interview is per se certainly a public form of communication; the object of the interview, 
however, is precisely the migrants’ inner speech, their reasoning and their decision-making 
processes. In this sense, two different argumentative discussions might be reconstructed in 
the data analysed in this paper: on the one hand, participants are clearly addressing the 
researcher as an antagonist in an argumentative discussion at some points; on the other hand, 
however, they also justify their views in front of an absent audience made of other people, 
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such as relatives, friends or others. Either participants feel that these people could disagree 
with their position or they overtly disagreed with it in previous social discussions. The latter 
argumentative discussion hints to the presence of inner argumentation, as participants 
confront different positions as a part of their own decision-making processes (for more 
discussion on these aspects, see Xenitidou and Greco Morasso, forthcoming; Rigotti and 
Greco Morasso, in preparation). 
I am aware that it might be argued that these data represent a spurious form of inner 
dialogue; in fact, once the subject is aware he is externalizing his inner debate to others, she 
will have an interlocutor in mind other than herself. In other words, the two argumentative 
discussions introduced above are necessarily intertwined, because the inner discussion is only 
manifested during the interview with the researcher. Yet, as it is methodologically complex, 
if not impossible, to get a pure form of inner debate, this spurious form represents a good 
approximation. Besides, previous studies in cultural psychology have already proven in-depth 
interviews effective to picture the person’s inner debate when he or she is still living a rupture 
as well as when reconstructing it afterwards (Zittoun 2006, 2009; Kadianaki 2010). 
4 Discussion of the results 
In this study, two important clues have been found to the presence of others in inner debate; 
such presence, as anticipated in sections 1 and 2.2, testifies to the contiguity and structural 
analogy between inner debate and social argumentation.  
A first clue (section 4.1) is the emergence of complex argumentative discussions 
reported by the interviewees, in which it is possible to identify a protagonist and an 
antagonist within the speaker’s self. The antagonist is often advancing the position of some 
other (a friend, a family member, or someone else known by the speaker) with whom the 
speaker had been discussing about her decision. The results I am going to present here 
confirm both of Dascal’s suggestions presented in section 2.2. On the one hand, they prove a 
metonymical relation of inner and external dialogue, as the interviewees implicitly or 
explicitly refer to previous social argumentative discussions. On the other hand, there are 
structural analogies between inner dialogue and the ideal form of a social argumentative 
discussion, which I assume to be critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 
2004). As it will become clear, it is possible to do an analytical reconstruction of 
argumentation for inner dialogue as well. 
A second clue (section 4.2) is the presence of others as well as others’ viewpoints in the 
premises of the speakers’ own arguments. This shows that even single argumentative moves 
are inherently multivoiced and contributes to prove the contiguity between social and inner 
argumentation. 
 
4.1 Inner argumentative discussions 
When asked about their intentions for the future, participants often refrain from giving a 
clear-cut answer and discuss the reasons of their (often still open) pragmatic decision. When 
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they do not intend to go back home, they often feel that they carry the burden of proof, 
namely that they are in need to justify their position in front of a more or less defined 
audience; they seem to consider themselves as breaking common sense or a sort of natural 
expectation that every migrant wants to go back home at some point; they feel the need to 
clarify why their position is reasonable. It is important to consider that, when they do so, they 
put themselves in the role of an antagonist of a critical discussion; yet the interviewer, who 
has just asked about their intentions, is normally not as the protagonist. The interviewer, in 
fact, is neutral in relation to the migrants’ decisions; they have in mind other protagonists –
family, friends and other acquaintances – who would not understand or do not support their 
decision to stay over in London. In Bakthin’s terms, we might say that the addressivity of 
their discourse is oriented towards relatives and acquaintances. From the argumentative point 
of view, I will reconstruct the analytical overview of these inner argumentative discussions 
by referring to the pragma-dialectical notation (van Eemeren et al. 2002), in order to highlight 
the similarity of these examples to more canonical examples of social argumentation. 
Particular attention will be devoted to who the antagonist and protagonist are; because this 
shows how others are present in the inner argumentative discussion of the interviewed 
migrants. Generally speaking, inner discussions can be found in a large part of my interviews. 
However, they differ as for length and complexity of their structure. In what follows, I have 
chosen to report three representative examples, listed in such a way as to become 
progressively more complex and complete from the point of view of the development of an 
argumentative discussion. 
Davitaiii from Argentina describes her difficulty in deciding whether to stay over or go 
back and defines herself as “torn” by the experience of international migration. She does so 
against a background of expectations which derive, in her opinion, from the fact that she is of 
Jewish descent and both her grandparents migrated from Europe to Argentina before the 
Second World War. Despite being “traditionally” a member of a diaspora, she finds it hard to 
live abroad. Significantly, the term traditional in “I come from a very traditional family” (see 
example (i)) indicates in Davita’s case “propensity to migrate”.  
(i) So for my family it was (.) difficult yeah and sometimes I still feel that I am torn 
you know it’s not that I’m completely 100% (.) happy with being here in a way 
you know (.) I come from (.) I mean a very traditional family in a way it’s a 
Jewish family who are also used to: migrate in a way because my grandparents (.) 
came from somewhere else all my grandparents like two of them (.) from my 
father’s side they went to Argentina from (.) eh Poland (.) and from my: mum’s 
side eh: one came from Germany went to Uruguay first and the other came from 
Latvia (.) all kind of Eastern European so (.) and that happened in the twenties 
1920s-1930s before the war (.) so there is a history of migration in my family but 
still when it’s your own time it’s kind of hard I don’t know. 
 
In example (i), Davita advances her standpoint “it’s kind of hard [to migrate]” against a 
backdrop of family expectations which she reconstructs from her family history. The 
protagonist and antagonist of the critical discussion are both internal to the interviewee; she 
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thinks she should find it easy to be diasporic, but acknowledges it is not easy for her. The 
evaluation of her experience is still open. However, Davita does not discuss the reasons why 
she is still torn after almost fourteen years in the UK. For this reason, argumentation in this 
extract is limited to a difference of opinion, charcaterized by two opposing standpoints, or 
voices in a Bakthinian sense, both alive within Davita’s inner dialogue. 
Argumentation is more complex and more complete in the case of Francisca, a 
second-generation Dutch migrant who has long lived in Belgium and subsequently moved to 
London. She reconstructs a complex argumentative discussion in which, as Billig (1996) puts 
it, she reports both sides of the argument; curiously, she discusses at length her opponents’ 
reasons. Since she arrived in London in 1998, she never had a programmatic intention to stay 
over; yet she progressively felt like “more English” and she is now inclined to think she will 
not go back. She presents her standpoint (2) “We should not go back to Belgium”, supporting 
it against the opposite standpoint, (1) “We should go back to Belgium” (see tables 1 and 2). 
As mentioned, she devotes a long time explaining the reasons supporting (1). Although she 
lives the conflict between (1) and (2) personally, she positions herself as an antagonist against 
a protagonist who is represented by different instances. First, generically, “people”, who “do 
ask you that question [whether she intends to go back] a lot”, so that she gets “that question 
every time”. Second, her partner’s mother, who “is always looking after other grandchildren 
and she always feels guilty towards us” because Francisca’s children live far away and their 
grandmother feels she cannot be of much help with childcare on a regular basis. Third, 
common sense seems to be against Francisca’s decision; not coincidentally, she says “I 
wonder why I am making things so difficult”, thus (slightly ironically) interiorising the 
possible objections she has been summarizing. The fact that she partially understands the 
reasons of her multifaceted counterpart is probably the reason why she discusses at length all 
the advantages which she would have in Belgium:  
(ii) I think the thing is (.) oh I don’t know life there is easier (.) and I wonder why I’m 
making things so difficult for myself you know particularly with children I think I 
think it’s SO much easier to be with the family: and in an environment which is 
very supportive of having children (.) here it’s not necessarily the case (.) ah: in 
Belgium I think people are quite (.) quite child loving you know it’s not (.) you 
take your children to a restaurant people won’t look like you know noisy noisy 
brats whereas whereas here you feel there are things that you can’t just do with 
children or people don’t appreciate that much (.) so that’s different and also 
different in terms of childcare I mean if we had been in Belgium we could have 
had my sister and Philip’s parents and (.) […] 
 
From the point of view of argumentation, the discourse of Francisca’s opponents, who in this 
case play the role of protagonist of an argumentative discussion, can be reconstructed as a 
complex argumentation; 1.1, namely ease of life, is the main reason supporting standpoint 1; 
while 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 are two coordinate arguments supporting 1.1. 
 
1. We should go back to Belgium 
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1.1. Because life would be easier there 
1.1.1.a. Because it is a family-friendlier environment 
1.1.1.b. And because we would have relatives for childcare 
Table 1: Analytical reconstruction of the protagonist’s argumentation 
All these advantages notwithstanding, Francisca does not decide to go back. She announces 
her decision in front of a plethora of opponents, including, presumably, some part of herself:  
(iii) So in a way it would be easier (.) but I think I I’ve become more English (.) you 
know when you it’s it’s difficult because I grew up in Belgium my parents were 
Dutch so I was always a bit of a foreigner (.) even though culturally they’re not 
THAT different but (.) hh I never felt Belgian I was […] 
Her standpoint “we should not go back to Belgium” is left implicit in (iii); yet it is introduced 
by the linguistic marker “but” which indicates opposition to the preceding arguments. The 
reason she gives for her standpoint is at the identity level: she says she has become more 
English and, therefore, as we may infer, going back to Belgium would not be as desirable as 
others may think. Her argument goes on because she feels the need to justify why she has 
changed her loyalties (as she will say further on in her interview) and become more English 
than Belgian. As a backing, she says that she had always been a bit of a foreigner in Belgium 
as well, because she was born to foreign parents. Her parents, in fact, came to the Netherlands 
and Francisca always perceived some slight differences to her Belgian friends, spanning from 
language to cultural habits. 
2. We should not go back to Belgium 
2.1. Because I have become more English 
2.1.1. And this could happen because I had always felt a foreigner in Belgium (I was not a 
real Belgian) 
2.1.1.1. Because I was born to foreign (Dutch) parents 
Table 2: Analytical reconstruction of the antagonist’s argumentation 
 
I will now consider in greater detail an excerpt of an interview to Mary, a South 
African national who had been living in London for almost six years at the time of the 
interview. In Mary’s case as well, a complex argumentative discussion testifies to the 
presence of others in the interviewee’s inner dialogue. In answering to an interviewer’s 
question about her intentions for the future, Mary chooses to reconstruct the inner debate in 
which she is involved: 
(iv) Well for the moment we don’t have any plans at the moment of going back but (.) 
you you know if people (.) you know in my job (.) you talk with people every day: 
people sometimes ask so oh why did you come and: will you ever go back home 
(.) ah and I always say to them I m- ah the doors are never closed and I’ll never 
say we’ll never go back home (.) but (.) we don’t have any plans till now (.) and it 
would only be under the right circumstances all those reasons why we came (.) 
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they would have got to change I’m not gonna go back to that SAME (.) you know 
we we what I usually say is that we (.) I had to be working actually full time (.) for 
us just to pay listen I’ve (.) financially for my monthly expenses eh: people (.) 
who’ve been you know on HOLIDAY to South Africa might think oh gosh it’s 
cheap! Ah you know? (.) ah: but it’s it IS a wonderful country it’s beautifu:l has 
got good weathe:r beautiful you know (.) countryside and you know (.) the sea ah 
from Cape Town of course there’s lots of (.) COASTS and beaches and (.) 
vineyards and wi:ne and you know that’s all lovely (.) but eh (.) when ah when 
you go off with POUNDS (.) and you go (  ) restaurants than you go oh that’s 
cheap (.) but when you live there (.) and you earn that small sums that you earn 
then the things are expensive and you don’t go and eat out and you’re very careful 
when you drive park your car because petrol is expensive so you know for the 
locals (.) it’s not easy ah: (.) to (.) to manage (.) so: I don’t want to just (.) go back 
(.) to that […] 
 
Mary works as a physiotherapist; she owns a private practice in Northern London. She 
explains that she is sometimes asked by her patients (presumably other than South Africans) 
why she came to the UK and whether she intends to go back home at some point. Saying that 
in her job one talks with people every day, she seems to justify those questions as legitimate. 
As in Raskolnikov’s case (see section 2.1), we almost hear these patients’ curious and 
astonished intonation in Mary’s report. Yet, if we follow her reasoning, we discover that 
these patients, who – she adds – know South Africa because they have been there on holiday, 
are not simply asking questions; Mary interprets their asking as an indirect expression of the 
standpoint “you should go back home”, supported by two coordinate arguments: South Africa 
is cheap and it is a wonderful country. Table 3 reports an analytical overview (van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst 2004) of these arguments and standpoint:  
1. You should go back to South Africa 
1.1.a. Because South Africa is a wonderful country 
1.1.b. And it is cheap (so you won’t have problems living there). 
Table 3: Analytical reconstruction of “the people’s” position 
The two coordinate arguments are both referring to how much South Africa is an enjoyable 
country: it has the advantage of a beautiful landscape and climate and living there does not 
require too much effort, because it is cheap. Such arguments seem even more compelling if 
we think that Mary now lives in the United Kingdom; in fact, the stereotypical background of 
shared knowledge and assumptions about this country includes the image of London as a 
rainy, grey and expensive city. Of these two arguments, Mary accepts the former (1.1.a), 
while she does not agree with the latter (1.a.b). In accepting 1.1.a (“but it IS a wonderful 
country […] it’s all lovely”) Mary even substantiates it with more details, speaking about the 
beauty of South African coasts, beaches and vineyards; her longing for her home country 
informs her inviting description of it. However, this argument is not a sufficient reason to go 
back; as an antagonist to the “people” who advance it, she provides arguments to demonstrate 
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that 1.1.b is not a valid argument because it contains a false judgement: to Mary, South 
Africa is not a cheap country. This is a crucial aspect to be determined for Mary, because 
South Africa not being cheap is one of the reasons why the quality of life there was not 
satisfying to her; therefore, it is a good reason to stay over in England. To contrast this 
argument, Mary first pictures the protagonist as “people (.) who have been you know on 
HOLIDAY to South Africa”; the emphasis on “holiday” restricts the scope of their 
knowledge, signalling that they lack the natives’ experience, which she has got. Constructing 
the antinomy tourist/native is functional to the construction of Mary’s authority based on her 
position to know; she then says that “when you live there” you experience hard conditions 
and discover that this is not a cheap country to live in. This is an important reason not to go 
back, because, as Mary had explained before, because she had to work very hard to earn 
enough money to live, her quality of life was damaged: she hardly managed to see her son 
except in the late evening and she could not afford having a second child. All these 
conditions changed when she came to the UK: she started working on a part-time basis, thus 
finding more time for her family and yet being better off financially. After a few years, she 
gave birth to a second child. 
In Mary’s reflection, the argumentative discussion is clearly centred on an issue 
which she has been considering extensively in all of its sides. On the one hand, we may 
certainly conclude that, at some level, as in Davita’s and Francisca’s cases, Mary identifies 
with both the protagonist and the antagonist of the argumentative discussion. On the other 
hand, however, Mary takes a precise position: she has made up her mind to stay over in the 
UK and she justifies her position. Similarly to what happens in social debates, we might even 
retrace Mary’s strategic manoeuvring to win her cause and present her position as reasonable. 
Particularly salient is Mary’s strategic manoeuvring with the topical potential: first, she 
decides to only oppose argument 1.1.b; second, her way of contrasting it is focused on the 
topical choice of giving an account of herself as more authoritative speaker than her 
opponents, who have visited South Africa as tourists. 
The presence of external dialogues is reflected in the inner dialogues we have been 
considering: other interlocutors are always represented with their opinions and arguments. In 
some cases, as in Mary’s, we arrive at a very close picture of an argumentative discussion, 
including strategic manoeuvring. Clearly, this is an indirect representation, and the risk of 
incorrect representations of others’ positions of the straw-man type is always present. 
However, in studying inner dialogue in this paper, I do not aim at getting to a precise 
representation of the real dialogues in which Mary and the other migrants have been 
partaking; I am interested in what these migrants consider important for themselves. 
Therefore, it is precisely their representation of the others’ opinion which is important, 
because this is what they are considering as the protagonist’s opinion which needs to be 
contrasted. 
4.2 Argumentation from analogy and the presence of others  
Billig (1996: 140) has called attention to the connection between thinking and argumentation 
being one frequently made by ancient rhetoricians already. Isocrates (Antidosis, 256) is one 
of them: “the same arguments which we use in persuading others when we speak in public, 
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we employ also when we deliberate in our thoughts”. Interpreting Isocrates against the 
backdrop of contemporary studies in argumentation, we should say that the arguments of 
inner speech and of social speech are the same because we make use of the same argument 
schemes when thinking and when publicly speaking. In fact, because loci and argument 
schemesiv pertain to the structure of reasoning, they may be used to analyse not only 
argumentation but also other forms of reasoning, such as explanation or inner reasoning 
(Rigotti and Palmieri 2009). In this paper, I will discuss a specific argument scheme, namely 
analogy, which frequently occurs in my data, arguing that this is important for the situation of 
international migrants. By analysing argumentation based on analogy, I will show how the 
presence of others in inner dialogue may be retraced even in the structure of a single 
argumentative move. By this doing, I will further substantiate, on the basis of real examples, 
Dascal’s claim that there are structural analogies between debating with oneself and debating 
with others. 
The locus from analogy is included in almost all typologies of argument schemes for 
its ubiquity in human reasoning (cf. Garssen 2001, Doury 2009). The medieval tradition 
would have categorized analogy under the extrinsic loci. Via extrinsic loci, the arguer 
connects to the state of affairs considered in the standpoint not for its intrinsic properties but 
in relation to another possible world (cf. Rigotti 2009). This makes extrinsic loci in general 
and analogy in particular important for allowing the presence of others in inner dialogue, as 
they programmatically foresee a comparison between different worlds. Reasoning from 
analogy is typical of people who are experiencing moments of rupture and transition (Greco 
Morasso 2010). Migrants certainly fall into such category. In my corpus, I found instances of 
argumentation from analogy in almost 77% of the interviews. In the majority of the 
interviews where analogy arguments were present (19), they appeared once or twice; but in a 
few interviews (3) arguments from analogy occurred 3 times. These rough statistics show 
how much argumentation from analogy is present in migrants’ account of their experience. 
As the world they live is uncertain, they find it useful to refer to another known world, 
similar to their situation, to find the cognitive and emotional resources to cope with their 
decisionsv. In the example discussed by Greco Morasso (2010), the analogy is based on the 
comparison between the arguer’s world and the imaginary world of a novel. In the case of 
migrants, the analogy is frequently made between the uncertain situation that one is living; 
and another experience of migration in the past, be it a personal experience or a reported one 
(based, for example, on a relative’s life). I will analyse a single exemplary case, in which the 
interviewee uses both the domain of a relative’s experience and that of her personal 
experience to reason from analogy and make sense of her present situation. 
Linda is from the Ticino Canton in Switzerland and a married to a Dutchman. First, 
she draws on her husband’s experience as a resource to reason on her present experience. In 
fact, her husband, an academic researcher in the so-called hard sciences, had left the 
Netherlands for a post-doc position in Switzerland. He had been living there for several years 
before they both moved to London. Second, Linda pictures the moments in which, in order to 
study at university, she moved from the Italian-speaking Ticino Canton to settle at first in a 
town within the French-speaking area and then in a larger German-speaking city. In both 
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cases, the analogy with what she has been living allowed her to conclude that she could cope 
with her migration to London (see example (iv) and the analyses in Figure 1 and 2). 
(v) Linda […] I think (.) the problem is I don’t know thinking that in any case 
hevi did it already this step coming to Switzerland fro- from Holland 
he had already: to adapt a bit to a new life (.) and in any case the 
experience being from Ticino is a bit different because even if you 
stay in your country (.) eh going to the French or the German parts of 
Switzerland was a cultural change in any case: another language other 
traditions respectively influenced by France or Germany ehm (.) I 
don’t know I found it in any case almost like going abroad even if you 
stay in your country (.) stamps are the same your bank is the same but 
(.) language and cultures are different (.) and (.) it’s peculiar  
Sara So you felt you had already [made 
Linda [like a sort of emigration then and so: 
Sara Then the first phase of your experience was helpful to you let’s say 
[…] 
 
In order to analyse argumentation from analogy in example (iv), I will adopt an approach to 
the analysis of argument schemes known as the Argumentum Model of Topics (henceforth: 
AMT). First proposed in Rigotti and Greco Morasso (2006), this model has been then 
developed in a series of publications; Rigotti and Greco Morasso (2010) specifically discuss 
an example of argumentation from analogy. Notably, the AMT allows analysing the 
inferential configuration of arguments by distinguishing, on the one hand, premises of a 
procedural (formal) nature, directly depending on the locus, i.e. the relation or principle of 
support connecting standpoint and argument (see the textboxes on the right in figures 1 and 
2). On the other hand, it accounts for material premises, connected to the speakers’ cultural 
and personal experience. Endoxa are general statements concerning values and the 
interpretation of reality (see boxes on the left in figures 1 and 2); while data are pieces of 
experience. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the AMT reconstruction of the inferential configuration of Linda’s two 
arguments from analogy. Figure 1 concerns her analogy with her husband’s experience; 











In both cases, others are present in Linda’s inner dialogue: her husband and her younger self. 
The AMT representation allows showing where and how others appear in Linda’s 
argumentation. Indeed, the very structure of the locus from analogy foresees a possibility for 
a parallelism with somebody else’s experience. Of course, in this case, the presence of others 
is dissimilar from the cases seen in the previous section. In fact, others are not present as co-
arguers holding a different position but as persons who lived a similar experience. In other 
words, they do not partake as protagonist in the inner argumentative discussion; but their 
presence permeates the migrant’s argumentation.  
Thus, the analysis of argumentation from analogy contributes to show that the world of inner 
dialogue is not completely detached from that of public argumentation and, more in general, 
from social life. Others are there; they ask questions, make criticisms, advance standpoints 
which may trigger an argumentative discussion in us.Yet sometimes it is their mere presence 
which questions us; it is their life which fills up the premises of our own pragmatic 
arguments. In Linda’s case, it is in the “Data”, namely in the concrete evidence she is 
drawing upon, that the presence of others appears. This certainly reminds us of the 
Bakhtinian concept of the dialogic orientation of any and every discourse (Bakhtin 1981) and 
it substantiates it in some way, by showing that even the inferential configuration of an 
argument may be dialogically oriented. 
5 Conclusions 
 
With this paper, I would like to contribute to exploring the hitherto largely unknown path 
which brings from public debate and argumentation to the mysterious realm of inner dialogue 
and decision making. Following Dascal (2005), I set out with the hypothesis that these two 
territories are contiguous and structurally similar; and I argued that the presence of others in 
inner dialogue is a clue suggesting that such contiguity and similarity exists. In my analysis, I 
substantiated this hypothesis with empirical data coming from inner dialogues of 
international migrants. There is certainly still much to do to trace a precise map of the 
relationship between public debate and inner debate. However, with this contribution, I 
showed two important ways in which others are present in inner debate, focusing in particular 
in moments of rupture and transition, in which the interviewed migrants are in front of a 
difficult decision like, for example, whether to stay or to go back home. These decisions 
emerge as multivoiced decisions in two senses. 
First, inner debate could often be reconstructed in our corpus as an argumentative 
discussion, as proven by the three representative examples chosen for this study. In this case, 
others may be seen as the protagonist of such a discussion, who support a certain “common-
sense” opinion about what the interviewee should do; if she does not agree, she feels the need 
to present the protagonist’s standpoint and arguments and to contrast it with her standpoint 
and arguments. What results is a reported argumentative discussion, in which it is the 
migrant’s own responsibility to be as critical as possible in the evaluation of both sides, as 
Billig (1996) suggests. Second, when analysing the structure of single argumentative moves, 
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they appear profoundly dialogic, in a Bakhtinian sense. Others are present even in the implicit 
premises of the arguer’s monologic argumentation, thus showing inherent multivoicedness in 
the participants’ arguments. The locus from analogy is of particular significance in my 
corpus; it allows the possibility of contrasting the state of affairs which the standpoint is 
referring to with another possible world, virtually including the presence of others. In the 
analyses I presented, the experience of others was present at the level of contextual (material) 
premises and, in particular, data (in terms of Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2010). Both these 
paths have just been opened and certainly are in need for further exploration, including the 
analysis of larger sets of data. In particular, as the locus from analogy has frequently emerged 
in my data, I have in mind to pursue a more detailed research on the role it may have in 
migrants’ experience of adjustment. Besides, the context of a reported argumentative 
discussion of the type emerging from in-depth biographical interviews still needs to be 
thoroughly described in terms of an activity type, also highlighting its difference from public 
communication and its relation to inner dialogue. 
Finally, one important limitation of this paper and of previous literature on inner 
debate as a form of argumentative discussion concerns the fact that both theories and 
examples (including my own) tend to concern cases of pragmatic decision-making. 
Individuals are said to engage in internal argumentation when they have to decide one course 
of action among other possible ones. Nevertheless, inner dialogue certainly occurs as well in 
knowledge-oriented practices, such as learning. The relation between pragmatic and 
knowledge-oriented argumentation in inner dialogue still needs investigation. 
                                                          
Notes 
 
i Calling Bakthin a semiotician is problematic, as he rarely employed the term sign. Nevertheless, he may be 
considered a semiotician in the present widely accepted use of this word, namely as somebody concerned with 
meaning in communication (cf. Wertsch 1991: 49).  
ii For reasons of sample uniformity, all of the interviewees were first generation migrants. Twenty-four of them 
had been living in London for a time span ranging from 1 to 14 years. Nevertheless, five extreme cases 
(Flyvbjerg 2001) of longer-term migrants (15 to 22 years spent in the UK) have been included in the sample to 
examine processes of rupture and transition in a longer time perspective. I whish to thank one of my anonymous 
reviewers, who observed that different time spans might bring as a consequence different participant 
perspectives on the rupture of migration, also including possible changes of memories over time. This is 
certainly possible and should be considered at a later stage of this research. As a first approach to the study of 
argumentation and inner dialogue, however, the focus was on argumentative discussions as they are reported by 
the participants in the here-and-now of the interaction with the researcher, irrespective of their temporal 
evolution. 
iii For reasons of privacy, all proper names are pseudonyms. 
iv For a discussion about the connection between argument schemes and loci see Rigotti and Greco Morasso 
(2010). 
v For the sake of completeness, it is important to say that the locus from analogy is not limited to pragmatic 
argumentation in decision-making activities. In my corpus, I found instances of argumentation based on analogy 
in cognitive processes; for example, in the process by which a migrant and a foreigner gets to know about the 
host country. 
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